to divine truth," but it is not an act of the intellect alone. The will also is involved, and therefore the act of faith is a free act. Thomas explains that "although elements pertaining to the will can be considered accidental to the acts of the intellect, they are however essential to faith."
8 Since the will is involved in faith, so also is love. "Love is called the form of faith, in so far as the act of faith is perfected and formed by love." 9 This is the kind of faith that the Council of Trent later taught to be necessary for salvation: "We may be said to be justified through faith, in the sense that 'faith is the beginning of man's salvation' ... 'without which it is impossible to please God' (Hebrews 11:6) and to be counted as his sons." 10 Faith is not only fides fidueialis, trusting in God, as Luther implied, but includes also an assent to some truths 11 and, as James taught, is "dead without works" (James 2:17). 12 Though Trent offers no concise definition of faith, its characteristics are clear. It is a free act, embracing more than just intellectual assent to truths, and it is necessary for salvation. That teaching will be continued in both Vatican Councils.
The First Vatican Council repeated what had become traditional Catholic doctrine: faith, which is "a supernatural virtue by which, under God's inspiration and grace, we believe to be true what he has revealed," is "the beginning of human salvation." 13 It emphasized more than Trent did that faith is more than intellectual assent, teaching that it is an act "by which a man gives free obedience to God by cooperating and agreeing with his grace, which can be resisted." 14 The Second Vatican Council moved even further away from an overly intellectualist conception, teaching that the obedience of faith is an act "by which man entrusts his whole self freely to God, offering 'the full submission of intellect and will to God who reveals,' and freely assenting to the truth revealed by him." 15 Faith is not only intellectual but is more especially personal.
A characterization of Christian faith, then, is not difficult to provide. I borrow a summary from Juan Alfaro. Faith "includes knowledge of a saving event, confidence in the word of God, man's humble submission and personal self-surrender to God, fellowship in life with Christ, and a desire for perfect union with him beyond the grave. Faith is man's comprehensive 'Yes' to God's revealing himself as man's savior in Christ." 16 Wood might argue that these are "maximalist terms." 17 I
8 De Ventate q. 14, a. 3, ad 10. 9 ST 2-2, q. 4, a. 3, c. 10 DS 1532. U DS1534. 12 DS 1531 and 1569. 13 DS 3008. 14 DS 3010. 15 Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation, no. 5. 16 "Faith," in Sacramentum Mundi: An Encyclopedia of Theology (New York: Herder, 1968) 2.315. 17 Wood, "The Marriage" 282.
respond, on the contrary, that they are minimalist. The faith that is obedience and self-surrender to God, the traditional fides qua creditor, is a free, and at least a minimally conscious and explicit, act. It is in this sense that the term "faith" will be used throughout this essay.
FAITH AND SACRAMENT
The answers to the theological and canonical questions dealt with in this essay depend on the answer to one foundational question: Is the personal faith of the sacramental participant 18 necessary for salvation? The answer to that general question will contribute to the answer to a more specific question: Is the personal faith of a participant necessary, not just for the fruitftilness but also for the validity of the sacrament? It will contribute an answer, therefore, to an even more specific question: Is the personal faith of the participants, that is, the marrying couple, necessary for the validity of the sacrament of marriage? The theological answer to the foundational question is, beyond any doubt, "yes." The theological answer to the other two is equally "yes." It is not enough, of course, simply to record these answers; they must also be explicated theologically. I shall explicate each in turn. Martin Luther made his stand on "faith alone" (sola fides). The Council of Trent, though wishing to combat the Lutheran teaching that faith alone was necessary for salvation, still left no doubt about the necessity of personal faith: "We may be said to be justified through faith, in the sense that 'faith is the beginning of man's salvation,' the foundation and source of all justification, 'without which it is impossible to please God' (Hebrews 11:6) and to be counted as his sons." 19 The same teaching is repeated in the important chapter on justification, where baptism is 18 Since, in modern sacramental theology, a sacrament is not a thing which one can receive, but a symbolic interaction between God in Christ and humans in which one can participate, I choose the personal word participant and refuse the objective recipient. described as "the sacrament of faith, without which no man has ever been justified." 20 The Latin text leaves no doubt that the phrase "without which" (sine qua) qualifies faith and not sacrament or baptism, both of which would require sine quo. 21 There is not the slightest doubt that the Fathers of Trent wished to affirm the primacy of active, personal faith for salvation.
Faith and Salvation
The firm Tridentine position notwithstanding, the polemical context of the times created an uneasiness in Roman Catholic assertions about faith and its place in the process of salvation. Following Trent's lead of isolating, in order to condemn, the error in the assertions of the Reformers, Counter-Reformation theologians advanced their theologies as counterpoint to those of the Reformation. Nowhere did this theological minimalism, and frequent nominalism, cause more detriment than in the understanding of the role of personal faith in the sacraments. That detriment crystallized in a restricted notion of the Scholastic expression opus operatum.
22

Faith of the Participant and Sacrament
In the years immediately preceding the convocations at Trent, nominalism was rampant in the theological disciplines. Nominalist theologians taught that the only thing a person receiving (sic) a sacrament need do was to place no obstacle to grace. This meant that one needed only to be free from mortal sin; grace was then conferred by the mere physical positing of the rite. It was just such a mechanical understanding of opus operatum that provided the basis for the objections of the Reformers about automatic grace and led to their rejection of the very notion of opus operatum.
Since nominalist theologians, however, constituted a majority at Trent, it was the nominalist definition that became u the exhaustive definition of the opus operatum of the efficacy of any sacrament." 23 The complementary scholastic concept oí opus operantis was developed as something separate. One could first receive sacramental grace by receiving a sacrament free from grave sin and with the right intention. Then, ex opere operantis, one could receive other graces. Such a dichotomy of opus operatum and opus operantis was foreign to the thinking of the great 20 Scholastics, of whom Aquinas can again serve as exemplar. Thomas frequently used the concept opus operatum in his early Commentary on the Sentences but never in his final work, the Summa Theologiae. This fact may be taken as indication that he did not consider the term necessary to the presentation of a mature sacramental theology. Indeed, "the truth that this terminology was intended to bring out was presented satisfactorily, and even in finer detail, in his Christological appreciation of the sacraments."
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The Christological character of a sacrament as the work of God in Christ is the fundamental doctrine underlying Thomas' understanding of opus operatum. On this fundamental basis rest all other ways of using the phrase. Baptism, for instance, "justifies ex opere operato: this is not man's work but God's." Baptism has effect, not because of the merits of the person being baptized, "but because of the merits of Christ." It is efficacious "because of the passion of Christ."
25 Opus operatum relates sacramental validity to the passion of Christ. It is not the external rite that effects grace, at least not as principal cause, 26 but the sacred reality that is signified by the external rite, namely, the gracious and salvific action of God in Christ.
Opus operatum contrasts the constitution of a sacrament qua external sign in the Church and the subjective disposition of either the minister or the recipient. Because of the action of God in Christ embodied in it, a sacrament is constituted as valid sign without any contribution from the recipient, without any opus operantis. It is not, however, constituted as an efficacious sign, that is, as a sign which actually mediates grace, without opus operantis. Since a sacrament is not just any sign of grace but specifically an efficacious sign, if it is not consituted as efficacious sign, then it is not constituted as sacrament. 27 For the great Scholastics, opus operatum and opus operantis were not dichotomized as they were to be in the Counter-Reformation church. They were essentially related. The latter was regarded as the "personal aspect in the justifying process of any sacrament, that aspect by which a free and responsible person accepted God's grace" offered in the efficacy of the former.
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It is true that Thomas distinguishes two separate effects of sacraments. There is, first the perceptio sacramenti, the reception of a valid sacrament, 24 which he teaches is quite unrelated to the faith of the participant. There is, secondly, the perceptio rei sacramenti, the fruitful reception of sacramental grace. 29 This doctrine on the validity of a sacrament without any contribution on the part of the participant, however, needs to be understood in its own context and not in that of a later, juridically controlled theology.
Thomas' distinction between perceptio sacramenti and perceptio rei sacramenti rests on a view of sacrament as a thing. That thing owes its validity to the fact that it is an opus dei et Christi and, therefore, valid qua thing-sign irrespective of any contribution from the recipient. But, though he subscribes to this established view, Thomas also has no doubt about "the abnormal and, in the end, monstrous character of this hypothesis. Every sacrament for him remains a sign and a proclamation of personal faith. Whoever receives it without believing in his heart places himself in a violent state of 'fiction' and deprives himself of sacramental grace."
30 Albert the Great is more explicit, stating baldly that the sacrament of marriage derives its efficacy not only ex opere operato but also ex opere operantis. 31 Bonaventure echoes this opinion, teaching that the sacrament of marriage can be distinguished only by a modicum of personal faith.
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Contemporary sacramental theology approaches a sacrament not as a thing which believers receive, but as a graced interaction in and through which they express both their acceptance of the gift of God and the gift of themselves in return through Christ in the Spirit to the Father. Considered in the abstract, a sacrament may be located only within the category of efficacious sign. If that is all there is to a sacrament, then it is constituted as valid without any contribution on the part of the participant. But that is not all there is.
A sacrament in the concrete, one in which a real human person participates, requires a third category, that of participating subject. There is no concrete possibility of a concrete efficacious sign without a human subject for whom it is a real, efficacious sign. There is, specifically, no concrete possibility of sacramental signification without a human subject who participates in a symbolic action and relates this action with the Church to God in Christ. 33 The sacramental sign in baptism, for instance, is not just physical water. It is water poured on a human subject within a matrix of meanings that includes God in Christ, Christ in the Church, and human subject in the Church and in Christ. A sacrament does not happen when a human subject submits to a physical rite, for a sacrament is not a naked physical rite but a symbolic interaction.
A tradition in the Church, established in the controversy between Augustine and Pelagius and verified regularly ever since, is that men and women are free persons and are graced, not against their will, but according to their cooperation (cooperatio). 34 If they have no intention of personally participating in a sacrament, then no mere physical submission to a physical rite will submit them to a saving sacrament. In such a case, though I have no doubt that a sacramental opus operatum is objectively offered by God in Christ in the Church, I equally have no doubt that a subject fails to participate in it. The sacrament offered still signifies the saving action of God in Christ in the Church, but not as concretely significative, and therefore effective and sacramental, for this subject. The subject's opus operantis is required in order to transform the opus operatum into an efficacious sign of the action of God in Christ, that is, into a valid sacrament.
35
It is for the validity of sacramental signification that the faith of the participant is required. One "must signify acceptance of what the church offers. Otherwise the sacrament is not a concrete, practical sign of the divine will to save all men." 36 Since the Catholic tradition of the past millennium teaches that sacraments cause by signifying, when they do not signify neither do they cause; and when they do not cause, they are not valid sacraments. It is not just that they are valid but fruitless sacraments. They are fruitless precisely because, for this individual, they are not efficacious signs and, therefore, not valid sacraments. The participant's opus operantis is required to make a sacrament fruitful because it is first of all required to make a sacrament a concrete and valid sign. They cannot be graced coercively or automatically, for that would violate their nature. 38 A sacrament is a sign not only of the gracing action of God in Christ (opus operatum), but also of the free faith of the participant cooperating with grace in this ritual (opus operantis). A valid sacrament requires the conjunction of both the action of God and the faith of the participant, and only in such conjunction is there free, and therefore valid and fruitful, interaction between them. As Aquinas taught long ago, the passion of Christ "achieves its effect in those to whom it is applied through faith and love and the sacraments of faith."
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In an analysis of remarkable depth, Villette argues that "rooted in the scriptures and the teaching of the Fathers, systematized in various ways in the Scholastic period, defined ... by the Council of Trent, defended and explicated by the post-Tridentine theologians," 40 there is a doctrinal constant in the Roman Catholic position vis-à-vis personal faith and sacraments. That constant is the simultaneous and complementary affirmation of the efficacy of sacraments instituted by Christ and the absolute necessity of personal faith for this efficacy to impact on a concrete subject. Up to the Council of Trent, Catholic theologians affirm unanimously that sacraments are efficacious "by" faith, "in" faith, "in proportion to" faith. After Trent, they insist that "faith alone" did not justify, but faith in and through sacraments. This was not, however, to deny the necessity of faith but to deny only that faith alone was necessary. When the Second Vatican Council taught that sacraments "not only presuppose faith but by words and objects they also nourish, strengthen and express it," 41 it was merely summarizing a long-established Catholic tradition.
Faith and the Sacrament of Marriage
If the argument of the preceding sections is valid, then the assertion of this section is already demonstrated. The active faith of the participants is an essential prerequisite not just for the fruitfulness of a sacrament but also for its very validity. That the Code of Canon Law's assertion, "a valid marriage contract cannot exist between baptized persons without its being by that very fact a sacrament" (canon 1055, par. 2), is at odds with this theological assertion is of no decisive theological import. As I stated at the outset, law likes clarity and likes to create clarity where there is none. Today, the faith-situation of baptized persons is anything but clear, and the Church and its theologians acknowledge two kinds of baptized, believers and nonbelievers. 42 The two are distinguished theologically on the basis of the presence or absence of active personal faith. They ought never, therefore, to be equated ki law as easily as the Code equates them.
Of course, in any given case the active faith or nonfaith of a baptized person (and the various shades in between) will not be easy to ascertain. But no amount of legal presumption will supply for the lack of active faith and consequent lack of sacramentality. Convinced of the necessity of faith for valid baptism, Augustine sought to make good the evident lack of faith in infant baptism by arguing that ecclesia fidem supplet.
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That argument cannot be applied in the case of marriage, for in marriage, we are dealing with adults who are required to have an active faith to participate in any sacrament, baptism as well as marriage, witness the scrutinies at the baptism of adults.
Marriage becomes a sacrament, not because of some juridical effect of baptism, but because of the active faith of the couple. Those who marry without active Christian faith, be they ever so baptized, marry also without Christian sacrament. Elaboration and demonstration of that assertion follows from a brief consideration of the underscored adjective Christian.
An extraordinary statement by Wood may serve as introduction and counterpoint to this consideration. "A marriage entered into with an intention to indissolubility, fidelity, and openness to children comprises a sacramental marriage for the baptized person the religious marriage is valid when the prevailing will is to marry, even if the couple would wish to exclude the sacrament." 44 Surely not. Surely a valid Christian sacrament, something more than a "religious marriage,'' must have some explicit reference to that more. And surely that more embraces explicit reference to Jesus, who is actively confessed as the Christ, and to that community of people called Church, which is actively confessed as the Body of Christ in the world.
In The intention to participate in any sacrament is the intention to participate in a Christ-event. The intention to participate in a Christian marriage is the intention to participate in a sacramental marriage explicitly acknowledged as a Christ-event. In Tillard's judgment, "the request for a sacrament can never be the request for a purely external ritual that has no connection with the mystery of salvation. The request for a sacrament is a request for a 'rite that gives salvation'. " 45 The covenant of Christian marriage becomes sacramental, Martelet argues, "only if the future spouses freely consent to enter into married life by passing through Christ into whom they were incorporated in baptism." 46 The Second Vatican Council had specific theological statements to make about Christian marriage, statements repeated more or less faithfully in the new Code of Canon Law. "The intimate partnership of married life and love ... is rooted in the conjugal covenant of irrevocable personal consent." It is "a reflection of the loving covenant uniting Christ with the church," and is "a participation in that covenant."* 1 If it does nothing else, 48 the word "covenant" returns the conception of Christian marriage to its roots in the Christian Scriptures.
The Christian faith tradition reveres three covenants. There is, first, the steadfastly loving covenant of the Old Law, uniting Yahweh and Yahweh's people. There is, second, the steadfastly loving covenant of the New Law, uniting Christ and Christ's Church. There is, third, the steadfastly loving covenant of Christian marriage, uniting a Christian man and woman in an intimate partnership of life and love. The third covenant is rooted in the other two. It is rooted not only in the love of the spouses for one another but also in the love of Christ for his Church and, therefore, also for them. It is this rootedness that moves the Catholic traditions to speak of Christian marriage as the symbol or sacrament of the loving union between Christ and the Church. 49 The key that opens the door to such covenantal and sacramental meanings is not just the intention of the spouses to marry, their intention to "fidelity, indissolubility, and opennes to children," but rather their intention informed by their Christian faith to be rooted in, to represent and to pass their marriage through Christ and his Church. Consent may make marriage as a secular institution, but it is only Christian faith, a comprehensive, personal "yes" to Christian and salvific realities, that makes it also a sacrament.
It is not the naked intention to marry, even to marry in some religious rite, that makes valid Christian sacrament. It is the Christian faithinformed intention to marry in a ritual that publicly proclaims to the spouses, to the Church, and to the world not only "I love you," but also "I love you in Christ and in his Church." That active and faith-informed proclamation creates not only a marriage but specifically a Christian marriage. It is time to consider the intention that undergirds that proclamation. In the tradition derived from Scholasticism, faith refers either analogically to the power of faith (virtus fidei) or univocally to the explicit act of faith (actus fidei). A virtus is a quality 56 ordered to an act, 57 a power to act. A virtue is a necessary prerequisite to the corresponding act, but it is not the act nor does the act ineluctably follow from the virtue. The Catholic tradition holds that it is the virtue of faith that is bestowed in baptism. 58 For that virtue to become a personal act of faith, it must be activated, freely, explicitly, however minimally.
In a grown-up person, Orsy comments, "the infused virtue must blossom out in a personal act." 59 It is that personal act of faith, however minimal, and always under the grace of God, 60 that transforms the human 53 "Faith and the Sacrament of Marriage," Irish Theological Quarterly 52 (1986) 172-73 (emphasis added). 64 Orsy, "Faith, Sacrament" 387. 55 Wood, "The Marriage" 294. 66 ST 1-2, q. 49, a. 1.  57 ST 1-2, q. 49, a. 3.  58 ST 3, q. 69, a. 4 . 59 Orsy, "Faith, Sacrament" 383 n. 7. 60 Cf. DS 373-97.
being from one who can be a believer into one who is a believer. It is in that act of faith, and not just in the virtue of faith, that one cooperates with God-in-Christ and Christ-in-Church to transform secular realities, including marriage, into Christian sacraments. It is that act of faith that is required for right sacramental intention.
RELATIONSHIP OF CONTRACT AND SACRAMENT
If baptized nonbelievers cannot enter into a valid sacramental marriage, can they marry at all? Can they enter, at least, into a valid civil marriage? That question, on the answer to which dissentiunt doctores, 61 asks about the relationship between the contract of marriage and the sacrament of marriage. If the two are not separable, as the Code claims, then if baptized nonbelievers cannot enter into a valid sacrament of marriage, neither can they enter into a valid contract of marriage. In plain language, they cannot marry validly at all. If, on the other hand, the two are separable, then baptized nonbelievers who cannot enter into the sacrament of marriage because they lack active faith can, at least, enter into a valid civil marriage. Since that second opinion appears to be excluded by present jurisprudence, our analysis of the question must begin in the Code of Canon Law.
The 1917 Code asserts that "Christ the Lord raised the matrimonial contract between baptized persons to the dignity of a sacrament" (canon 1012, par. 1). The theological accuracy of that statement is doubtful. Though institution by Christ of marriage as a sacrament is retained today in Catholic theology, and explained sacramentally, 62 no Catholic theologian argues that it was specifically the contract of marriage that he established as sacrament. Though the Latin church committed itself in the twelfth century to the conception of marriage as contract, the Orthodox church has never considered the canonical contract to be of the essence of marriage, preferring the liturgical and priestly blessing symbolized in the crowning of the bride and groom. It is simply wrong, theologically, in the Catholic traditions, to claim without qualification that Christ raised the contract of marriage to the dignity of a sacrament.
Canon 1012, par. 2, repeated verbatim in new Canon 1055, par. 2, lies at the heart of the present question. "Consequently (quare), a valid marriage contract cannot exist between baptized persons without its being by that very fact a sacrament." The particle quare is of central interest here. It implies consequence from the previous statement and it is, therefore, translated correctly as "consequently." Here too there is a problem.
Can. 1012, par. 1 proclaims that every sacramental marriage is rooted in a valid marriage contract. But does it proclaim also the reverse? Does it teach that every valid matrimonial contract is thereby a sacrament? I think not. I can sympathize with the canonical codifiers in their hesita tion "to introduce sponginess into that firm canonical structure which locked the sacrament on to the solid juridical and readily proven fact of baptism." 63 But does what they assert canonically really assert that all that is required for a valid sacrament of marriage is valid baptism? I think not.
Among the Fontes for Canon 1012, par. 2, the 1917 codifier, Gasparri, includes the Council of Trent's formal teaching: "If anyone says that marriage is not one of the seven sacraments ... let him be anathema." 64 But note the different language in Trent and in the Code, the former asserting that marriage is a sacrament, the latter that the marriage contract between baptized persons is a sacrament. The two are vastly different assertions.
In a careful analysis of the notions of contract and sacrament at the Council of Trent, Duval points out what is, in fact, well known. It was by deliberate choice, not by some oversight, that the Council chose simply the word marriage and not something like the marriage contract between baptized persons. It did so to leave open a theological debate in which, as later, experts held different opinions. "Canon 1 of the Council wishes to affirm the existence in the New Law of α sacrament of marriage-but not that marriage in the New Law is always a sacrament." 65 To say "that the Council of Trent declared the inseparability of sacrament and con tract seems to weight the texts with a burden they are incapable of bearing logically or historically."
66 Far from declaring, even implicitly, the inseparability of contract and sacrament, Trent deliberately chose to leave the question open.
So, too, did the Theological Commission for the First Vatican Council, swayed by the Roman theologian, Giantommaso Tosa. The Commission judged that the inseparability of contract and sacrament was not a doctrine that could be defined because neither was it contained in the sources of revelation nor did it flow inescapably from any truth that was in the sources. 67 It is unfortunate that Garibaldi's invasion of the Papal States prevented that judgment from being debated in the Council and from being incorporated into the authentic teaching of Vatican I.
Gasparri's expansion of Trent from marriage to marriage contract between baptized persons may not be considered an explanation, and even less an authentic explanation, of Trent's doctrine. Indeed, the great codifier himself judged in 1891 that "marriage among Christians is a sign of a sacred thing in Christ and in the church, and to it grace is joined, but it is not proved that force of producing grace is placed in the matrimonial contract itself." 68 If we wonder what caused Gasparri to change his mind between 1891 and 1917, the Fontes may provide a clue.
The Fontes for canon 1012, par. 2 are well known, and I see no need to rehearse them yet one more time. 69 There is a hermeneutical need, however, to seek to understand them in their context. I suggest that, when the Fontes use the word contract, they appear to refer not so much to the contract between the spouses as to the marriage which results from it. The nineteenth century Fontes particularly assert the identity of "contract," that is marriage, and sacrament to assert the legitimate power of the Church over ^marriage among Christians" more than to assert the identity of legal contract and sacrament. An 1817 instruction from the Holy Office states this conclusion baldly: "There can be a contract of marriage which may not be a sacrament; nevertheless, there cannot be a sacrament of marriage in which the contract itself is not a sacrament."
In La Lettera to Victor Emmanuel II in 1852, Pius IX makes the clear assertion that "the conjugal union (i.e. marriage) among Christians is not legitimate if it is not in the sacrament of marriage." 70 That same year in Acerbissimum, he teaches that "there cannot be a marriage among the faithful without its being at one and the same time a sacrament." 71 In 1864 in the Syllabus, he condemns the following as false: "By the force of merely civil contract (i.e. civil marriage) there can exist among Chris tians a true marriage." 72 Finally, in 1875, Tuae Litterae condemned Belgian civil law as repugnant to Catholic doctrine because it taught "that the civil contract (i.e. civil marriage) can be separated from the sacrament among the faithful."™ Leo XIIFs important contribution to the Fontes is his encyclical letter Arcanum divinae sapientiae (1880), in which he follows the path marked out by Pius. In Christian marriage, as opposed to civil marriage, "the contract (i.e. the marriage) is not able to be dissociated from the sacrament; a true and legitimate contract, therefore, cannot be without being by that very fact a sacrament," and "every legitimate union among Christians is in itself and through itself a sacrament." 74 
